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Introduction 
Space transportation truly begins at the launch pad where the vehicle arrives for final 
processing prior to flight.  Production of the launch vehicle and its payload likely occurred 
elsewhere.  The question of who actually controlled the spaceport and its facilities was not a 
particularly controversial one or even a question at all until the 1990s.  It is not controversial 
today but the question has become who should run the federal spaceports?  Until that time, 
national security concerns drove the field along with the even more potent force of 
institutional inertia.  Having the federal government specifically the military be responsible 
for spaceport operations was both logical and necessary since the early facilities were built 
for the purposes of ballistic missile testing.  That situation has changed at least rhetorically 
more recently with the increasing internationalization of the space marketplace.  
Internationalization contains within it the kernel of enhanced competition – a dramatic 
change for the space transportation field.  For years, national security and other 
considerations made the space transportation industry a series of nationalistic enclaves 
(McLucas, 1991).  This situation usually still exists regarding any government payloads that 
normally fly upon national flag launchers.  Since 1991, private payloads have been 
increasing their proportion of the market (despite some short term downward fluctuations as 
in 2001), meaning that space transportation is now increasingly driven by cost factors rather 
than simply national preference especially when the satellite consortium purchaser is 
international.  Competition therefore becomes the new paradigm through which potential 
users look for the greatest value for the expenditure.  As part of this new marketplace, state 
spaceports are becoming increasingly visible as potential players in the space transportation 
field.  In this paper, state spaceports are described in terms of the forces driving change, the 
factors inhibiting their success, and a brief assessment of the future shape of state policy if 
long term success is desired. 
 
Winds of Change 
The forces creating the potential for establishment of state spaceports came from several 
directions.  No one factor in itself created this new opportunity for state level activity rather 
the totality of circumstances drove the situation (Handberg & Johnson-Freese, 1998).  Those 
forces can be conceptualized in terms of the changing international context, changing 
technologies and a changed domestic political climate (Handberg, 1995).  First, the end of 
Cold War eroded the perceived necessity for continuing the stringent national security 
restrictions considered typical of the era.  Evidence for that change came quickly with the 
entry of the former socialist states, Russia and China, into the international space 
transportation marketplace.  The road however has remained somewhat rocky given 
continued concerns about technology transfer issues with regards to China.  But, the result 
has been the creation of a space transportation marketplace that is becoming increasingly 
international in scope and competitive.  Internationalization means that cost factors became 
increasingly critical in acquisition decisions by payload customers.  At first, the focus was 
upon upgrading launch vehicles with a greater emphasis upon improving their marginal cost 
efficiency.  That focus has led to greater concern with processing costs – the time and dollars 
spent getting the launch vehicle prepared for lift off.  Newer launch vehicles such as the 
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Ariane, Delta and Atlas series rockets have achieved greater efficiencies while lifting larger 
payloads.  These new efficiencies are fundamental to the new marketplace given that the 
Russians and Chinese represent lower cost alternatives although the political issues over 
technology transfer and reliability have depressed Chinese competitiveness temporarily 
(Bates, January 28, 2002). 
One area in which major changes were projected is the question of launch facility or 
spaceport operation.  Given the military or governmental beginnings of the original national 
space programs, spaceports were federal government owned and operated, meaning the 
military for the larger facilities with NASA operating the Wallops Island Facility.  The 
national government in some institutional form was placed squarely in the situation of 
building and maintaining such facilities.  As long as national security considerations 
dominated, federal control remained both logical and necessary.  National security has not 
disappeared as a policy constraint but technological changes pointed to other options being 
viable. 
The second force was that of technology changes although the realities have been 
more complicated than most originally expected.  Among the technological factors was the 
changing mixture within the comsat market.  By the 1970s, comsat technologies had focused 
upon increasingly large geosynchronous orbiting communications satellites.  Satellite size 
growth meant the use of ever-larger launch vehicles, increasing the expense and complexity 
of operations.  By implication and design, the field was dominated by large corporations or 
government entities to the exclusion of other players.  These large corporate players had a 
mutuality of interest due to their past history as government contractors.  By the late 1980s, 
the technology had advanced so that satellites could now be considered for use in LEO and 
middle earth orbits.  These satellites were much smaller in size, relying upon new computer 
architectures and communication technologies to switch messages across multiple satellites 
rather than relying on a single fixed satellite.  Such projected satellite fleets (one was raised 
at one point on paper up to 844 then down to 288 satellites, now even lower) demanded great 
number of launches by smaller rockets, partially reversing the earlier trend toward bigger is 
better.  In addition, such satellites required different orbital inclinations, meaning more 
launch sites would be required for economical launch. 
Also, by the earlier 1990s, the hype associated with the Delta Clipper had established 
the concept of a reusable launch vehicle (RLV) as a viable launch option at least politically.  
The X-33 and X-34 programs were the programmatic embodiments of that RLV concept with 
their tremendous potential to completely reshape the space transportation marketplace. A 
flock of paper RLVs flew across the media and computer screens.  RLVs could in principle be 
launched and recovered from a multitude of potential geographic locations.  That removed 
the constraint of geographic location.  Standard expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) drop off 
stages, meaning that serious safety issues arrive if the area is populated.  China has ignored 
that constraint with a resulting loss of life as a result.  For the United States, spaceports 
were located along the coastline in order to improve safety.  The space shuttles returning 
from orbit routinely over fly populated areas for landing in either California or Florida.  
There are risks but they are deemed manageable (Handberg, in press). 
Technology change in either the form of smaller ELVs or RLVs opened the door for 
those states otherwise excluded to enter the space marketplace.  Unfortunately, that ended 
when the small satellite market subsided, as the projected launches did not occur.  Small 
launch vehicles also confronted adaptations by the large booster operators in the form of 
multiple satellite launches, further reducing the demand for launches.  Plus, the major 
entries into the mobile communications market encountered extreme economic turbulence to 
the point that the first entry, the Iridium, went bankrupt.  Iridium is back in service but its 
future remains unclear in terms of whether replacement satellite launches will occur or how 
many.  That collapse has also revitalized comsat operations built around fewer but larger 
comsats, removing those launches from the small launcher marketplace. 
The third force was the changed political-economic climate – a more gradual process 
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than the publicity and rhetoric would indicate.  In the earlier 1980s, the Reagan 
administration embarked upon a series of decisions aimed at reducing federal involvement in 
nonmilitary space, effectively opening the space marketplace up to more players.  Prior to the 
changes, twelve agencies had to assent before a nonfederal government launch could proceed.  
At the time, the early 1980s, however, the prospects for substantial change were minimized 
given the then existing international tensions which maintained security restrictions on 
space technologies. 
 
Inertia and the Winds of Change 
 Change comes slowly and erratically in politics when the issue at stake is perceived 
as either esoteric or obscure or both.  Engaging state governments in space-related activities 
represents an example of the latter situation.  From the beginning, space activity was 
defined largely through the prism of being a national level concern given its extraordinarily 
close linkages to the critical issues of national security and international politics.  The Apollo 
Project with its Cold War trappings hammered that subliminal message home. However, 
that era effectively ended with the crowning achievement of landing a man on the Moon but 
those old reflexes died hard.  Patterns of organizational behavior were apparently engraved 
in stone but time and events have slowly chipped away at those old signposts.  In the new 
era, the possibilities have dramatically escalated but must overcome both the old and the 
new.  The latter being obstacles raised as the involved parties perceive change as the 
opportunity to improve their individual fortunes.  The pursuit of individual advantage by all 
may in practice rebound to the detriment of all. 
 Regarding the establishment and operation of state spaceports, a number of factors 
impacted the field, further delaying even preventing progress toward the highly desirable 
goal of expanding the various states’ economic fortunes, the fundamental driver underlying 
all these efforts.  Those factors appear to group into three broad clusters.  The clusters have 
been generically labeled for analytical convenience:  bureaucratic, international-technological 
and federalism in action.  No one cluster by itself is sufficient to explain the erratic nature of 
the field’s development but each contributes to the continuing unevenness in moving 
forward.  No magic bullet has appeared cutting through the confusion because the issue 
remains so peripheral to the broader agendas of the relevant decision makers.  Many can see 




 The first cluster labeled “bureaucratic” encapsulates the reality that the 
implementation of state spaceports breaks the mold of expectations that has defined the 
entire field since its inception.  Beginning with the easiest part, the Air Force established 
itself around 1960 as the premier U.S. space service with regards such operations.  Removing 
its major components to NASA eliminated the Air Force’s major competitor, the Army.  The 
Air Force, thus, for over forty years has defined its mission as operator of the nation’s major 
spaceports.  That mission as originally defined did not encompass supporting commercial 
space activities.  Even when space operations expanded to include significant commercial 
activity, it remained clearly a secondary priority.  National security needs overrode that 
aspect so that Air Force and by extension federal government procedures and policies 
remained restrictive rather than facilitating.  The Air Force consistently acted to protect 
what it perceived as its institutional interests and by definition the national security interest 
since it considered the two to be synonymous. 
 The result has been a greatly delayed developmental process.  State initiatives 
operate at distinct disadvantage since the Air Force has been until recently under minimal 
pressure to move more quickly.  Range upgrading for example stalled for several years while 
funds were diverted to more pressing service needs.  The result was that equipment and 
procedures remained slow and at times obstructive for non-government users.  Delays and 
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impediments have made foreign competitors attractive to commercial payload owners 
because of their greater responsiveness.  State spaceports have been touted as an alternative 
but due to their location mostly on federal property, the restrictions have not been overcome.  
The Air Force continues to control flight scheduling and operates the flight safety system, 
which means these state spaceports cannot break completely out of the box.  Alaska’s 
spaceport is somewhat less restricted both by design and location, not being located on a 
federally controlled facility.  Change is clearly coming but only slowly.  The Air Force 
recognizes it must adapt but concern exists that once control is released, some unforeseen 
dire consequences will ensue.  Given the national security interests at stake, Air Force 
reluctance to change a system so accommodating their interests is understandable but 
disruptive to any orderly commercial developmental process.  Air Force reluctance is not 
entirely selfish but rather reflects the reality that organizations once put in place are 
difficult to move in new directions. 
 The larger contextual problem, however, is just simply inertia, not particularly 
bureaucratic but human.  Existing operating routines (comforting in their familiarity) must 
be broken along with well-worn thought groves.  This response occurs both in public settings 
and private discussions, changing long held views is hard.  One aspect is simply that until 
recently commercial space activities were perceived by many as somewhat disreputable even 
illegitimate when measured against the broader context of space activity.  Space, remember, 
is the ultimate final frontier, expanding the human mind and aspirations.  That attitude of 
disdain lingers in some Washington policy circles even though the recognition grows that the 
immediate future for human space activities will be more likely commercially based rather 
than continuing large government programs as in the past.  On the other side, the 
commercial space sector, which the states are struggling to mobilize in support of their 
efforts, is habituated to federal government leadership.  For industry, it has been difficult to 
challenge those who have led and provided (through DoD and NASA contracts) for nearly a 
half century.  Those habits of deference are being slowly broken, more often by outside events 
than dramatic initiatives by the private sector.  Remember the federal government (both 
military and civil) has been and remains the single largest and most constant source of 
revenue for the industry.  Within the past several years, more commercial launches occurred 
than government but old habits remain difficult to break plus market fluctuations keep 
government payloads attractive.  For all the criticism, NASA’s shift to smaller space science 
missions generated more launches than earlier projections would have for more companies. 
 Moving the field forward as implied by the establishment of relatively independent 
state spaceports demands stepping far beyond the established patterns.  That remains 
difficult for those losing total control (NASA and the Air Force) and for those who move into a 
totally commercial environment (the industry) where failure is not only possible but also 
likely.  Iridium is the symbol of that possibility.  Here, the thrust of the discussion comes 
from a more general perspective.  Change was originally forced by events outside the space 
field but responses by the participants are tempered by their past experiences and future 
expectations.  Thus, change comes albeit slowly, incrementally and erratically. 
 This can be seen the failure of the airport model to work in this particular context.  
Most advocates began with the assumption that spaceports were in many ways analogous to 
airports – organizations with which there exists a great deal of relevant experience.  Airport 
construction, expansion and operations have become major economic multipliers for many 
communities.  In a manner similar to interstate highways, a competitive airport can 
significantly alter and/or sustain economic distribution patterns.  The difficulty was that 
spaceports do not fit the existing pattern of transportation policy.  There were no established 
federal trust funds available to help defray constructions costs as with airports.  More 
critically, though commercial space launches have increased in numbers – the use rate is not 
equivalent to an airport.  In a single day, a medium sized airport launches more planes than 
commercial rockets lift off world wide in a year.  Therefore, revenue projections are lower and 
slower, discouraging those investors who demand quick more assured returns.  In addition, 
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state spaceports must be multi-functional.  One of their missions becomes generating future 
flights as exemplified by supporting research and development programs along with 
educational ones.  The Florida Spaceport Authority has grasped that reality and worked with 
it.  Airports do not routinely engage in such activities although they may support other’s 
efforts to generate more business and thus flights.  Treating spaceports as the next wave in 
the historical development of transportation policy is logical but not necessarily politically 
compelling which trumps technology.  Similar struggles occurred over trains, trucks and 
canals at different points in time. 
 
 International-Technological 
The second cluster is labeled “international-technological.”  This aspect reflects the fact that 
the implementation of space-related activities directly impinges upon the international legal 
system and is heavily influenced by technology change.  Therefore, state spaceports must 
operate within the parameters of international law and practice.  This reality has an 
inhibiting effect upon the states because the international system forces all commercial space 
operations to conform to rules generated when national government activities were the norm 
and the others the lonely exception.  In addition, the international regime was implemented 
as the product of fierce negotiations between socialist states resolutely opposed to furthering 
capitalism in any form and capitalist states comfortable with nationally directed economies 
and desirous of maintaining their advantages in exploiting space.  The result is a system, 
which regulates state space activities under tight national controls.  Change as embodied in 
American state run spaceports is difficult to accommodate given the cumbersome negotiation 
process conducted through the United Nations.  Therefore, states must operate within those 
existing rules whether they are effective or useful or not. 
 Additionally, commercial launch technologies are in a drastic state of flux as the 
struggle to lower dramatically high cost to orbit numbers accelerates.  For state spaceports, 
the gamble comes in deciding what type launch pad to construct.  That decision structures 
many future space launch options.  A wrong choice locks a particular site into obsolete or 
noncompetitive launch options.  This slows the decision process because delay allows further 
clarification (or confusion) regarding the most viable options.  Uncertainty in the 
marketplace is accentuated by the continued growth in the number of international and 
national competitors, further complicating choices.  The proliferation of possible flight 
choices reflects the fact that reliability problems have prevented any single vehicle or family 
of vehicles from dominating the market, thus easing the choice of launch pad configuration.  
The relatively small capital investments available for use in constructing these launch 
facilities makes correct choices even more critical if success is to be ultimately achieved. 
 
 Federalism in Action 
In the abstract, federalism implies an arrangement by which the functions of government are 
parceled out in a somewhat rational manner across both state and federal levels.  Obviously, 
the implementation process is more complicated in practice.  Space activities reflect that 
messiness at three levels:  the congressional-federal, among the states, and within the states.  
First, at the federal level, despite the legislation opening up the potential for state space 
activity, Congress has been largely indifferent to most suggestions for further legislation 
directing the bureaucrats to move more expediently on the issues.  Thus, bureaucratic 
obstacles are only slowly overcome.  The larger problem is simply that the fact that 
commercial state spaceports like many other state level economic issues are of interest to 
only a small proportion of the entire Congress.  Simply put, their constituents are not 
engaged in such activities and are unlikely to be so in the future.  Even if they are engaged, 
the relationship is often perceived as indirect.  Recent efforts have attempted to assess the 
total impact of space activities upon the total U.S. economy.  The dollar values are enormous 
( $61.3 billion) when one considers the relatively small and concentrated nature of the 
industry (Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, February 2001; 
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Office of Space Commercialization, 2001).  Space activities are perceived as being a function 
of more traditional national space participants not involving state governments.  Therefore, 
the issue remains largely an abstract one – most of Congress rhetorically supports some 
general notion of privatization and state initiative but not with any particular intensity.  
Indifference remains the more usual response, meaning significant new legislative actions 
becomes unlikely and financial incentives from the federal level minimal.  There has been 
much legislation introduced but little passed which supports state spaceport development or 
general space commerce but the opportunities and amounts are insignificant compared to 
other legislation. For example, among the bills proposed was the Invest in Space Now Act 
(HR 2177, 2001), Spaceport Equality Act (HR 1931, S.1243, 2001), both of which fell victim to 
the political gridlock in Congress. More critically, even if approved, those initiatives are 
considered unlikely to grow. 
 When Congress does act; however, it has often found the interested states divided as 
to what should be done and, more critically, who should be supported.  California and Florida 
engage in fierce competition for whatever federal grant funds become available and are 
aggressively pursuing possible launch customers.  This struggle between the largest and 
fourth largest states often paralyzes Congress or results in unsatisfactory proposals.  Alaska 
and Florida have de facto allied on some issues since Alaska’s spaceport will most directly 
compete with California for polar orbiting flights.   Alaska was able to leverage their 
congressional standing to generate moneys specifically designated for their location.  Virginia 
stands somewhat given the well-defined niche occupied by the Wallops Island Flight Facility.  
Conflict however is inherent between Virginia and Florida over any possible international 
vendor launches such as the Israelis with their small launch vehicles.  International launch 
systems represent a new area of conflict because of concerns over access to national markets.  
Small launch vehicles have tended to be limited to national payloads although Pegasus has 
launched at least one Brazilian satellite. 
 This competition between the states is heightened by their recognition that the space 
launch game remains a zero-sum one.  Over the next decade, there are only a finite number 
of launches projected even under the most optimistic scenarios (COMSTAC, May 2001).  
Those launch estimates vary dramatically but the reality is that there will only be a few 
occurring against the number of possible providers.  Thus, dominance or major growth in one 
competitor’s market share comes ultimately at the expense of the others.  Also, international 
competitors are developing more launch options that will further reduce the number of 
available payloads. 
 Finally, state legislatures are supportive in principle but not fiscally despite the 
projected large economic impact of space-related activities upon the states.  Several factors 
inhibit state legislative engagement with the issue.  First, the aura of continued federal 
dominance inhibits the states.  The potential for state participation is not truly appreciated 
or understood.  Second, state spaceports or their equivalent compete in state budgets for 
scarce discretionary dollars.  The budget revolution at the federal level and the devolution of 
responsibilities and costs of federal programs to the state levels is absorbing whatever 
discretionary moneys are available.  When ranked by legislators and other members of the 
elite, space-related activities are not priorities compared to education, environment or roads, 
never mind welfare now devolved unto the states.  Medicaid, for example, competes with 
state spaceports normally to the latter’s detriment.  Third, space-related activities when sold 
to the legislature are still perceived as future oriented programs rather than immediate.  
Given the uneven pace of the field’s development, such perceptions are not inaccurate, 
reducing incentives to push forward.  Politicians respond to visions of the future but are 
buffeted by more intense immediate pressures to help their constituents.  Investments in 
space can in their view be deferred into the indefinite future.  Only when the threat of a base 
or center closure or significant reduction in the scope of their operations arises do states 
become significantly engaged.  That specter haunts Florida and the Kennedy Space Center 
long term despite the recent decision to move shuttle operations to KSC.  Government space 
 6 
operations are political by definition, the President’s brother being governor did not hut 
KSC’s argument for moving rehab to the Center.  Previously, Democratic members of 
Congress kept it there in California.  Again, the threatened loss of constituent jobs mobilizes 
activity by key legislators and state governors.  The two Florida Space Business Summits are 
reflection of that perceived need to respond to a changing possibly adverse policy and 
economic environment.  Until that pressure arises however, most states defer to the federal 
role.  Again, the issue becomes changing the expectations or habits carried forward from the 
early 1960’s.  Those patterns no longer are sufficient to meet state needs.  No single factor 
explains the success or lack of success found among the various state spaceport initiatives.  
Rather, the combination reported above provides a more comprehensive explanation.  Each 
state has motivated individuals who push their efforts forward but larger contextual 
variables often assisted or negated their efforts usually the latter.  Change here is an 
outgrowth of technological dynamism combined with a fundamental restructuring of the 
politics underlying the field.  State spaceports operate in a policy environment still in the 
process of becoming. 
 
Some Immediate Steps 
 The immediate steps are occurring albeit in a marketplace growing even more 
confused than previously.  Several states have long been aware of the possibilities inherent 
in a state spaceport.  Florida, California and Virginia built upon existing federal spaceports – 
a situation that has proven both positive and negative.  Negative in that the federal 
government had to consent before any operations could be instituted and positive because 
various infrastructures were already in place that facilitates flight operations.  Alaska went 
it alone although supported by federal funding obtained by their congressional delegation, 
which had risen to power through the seniority system and change in party control.  These 
four constitute the “old guard” in that the office of the Associate FAA Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation for operations has approved their spaceports.  The aborted 
X-33 program with its possibilities for launch in nontraditional sites created interests among 
states formerly thought excluded.  New Mexico with its White Sands based spaceport concept 
was the most publicly aggressive in seeking to become an RLV base.  With the program’s 
collapse and cancellation, those efforts must shift gears while the Air Force and NASA chart 
their next steps. 
 More important to these efforts are the attempts to overcome or at least minimize 
state differences in support of a larger goal.  Two multi-state associations have either been 
formed or have extended their interest to incorporate state spaceports over the past few 
years.  The Aerospace States Association (founded in 1989 with four members now 
incorporates 40 states plus the District of Columbia) has a more diffuse mandate of fostering 
both aeronautical and space activities.  The National Coalition of Spaceport States (NCSS, 
July 26, 2001) came into existence on February 5, 2001, less than a month before the X-33 
cancellation.  There are fourteen member states (Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington and Wisconsin) whose mission is “to regain American predominance in 
commercial space development.”  Both of these organizations but especially NCSS represent 
formal efforts to cooperate in pursuit of more explicit recognition as to the economic value of 
space-related activities.  Clearly, ten of the members perceive space more broadly than in 
just an active spaceport although their assumption is that future RLV technology 
development will create opportunities that they will be prepared to pursue. 
 Such efforts are essentially expanding the definition of U.S. transportation policy to 
incorporate space transportation. An entire litany of possibilities will follow although not 
without a struggle as existing stakeholders resist a new member.  One can use the comsat 
market as a prototype for the future.  Existing electronic media (over the air and cable) 
resisted the enhancement of comsat delivery of television and radio.  Rules regarding local 
access and property restrictions upon dish size had to be attacked congressionally and 
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through the administrative process.  Expanding the definition of transportation enables a 
number of tools to be utilized such as trust funds and other fiscal devices. 
 The other major factor stands outside the states’ control – the commercial 
marketplace and the question of satellite size with effects upon usable launchers.  Even if the 
trust fund question is resolved favorably to the states, the economic realities may be slower 
to respond in terms of launch demand.  The reality is that states upon entering this field will 
find themselves immersed in the full play of capitalism.  Whether the states can handle what 
that means in practice is an interesting and unresolved question.  Governments are not 
normally so involved but here their instrumentalities, the spaceport authorities, must 
grapple with both national and international level variables. Success is not ordained but the 
first steps are being taken albeit with great trepidation.  The ultimate irony is that state 
spaceports represent an extension of the state in an era in which the political rhetoric is for 
government retrenchment and withdrawal from many areas of public life. 
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